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1 Introduction
Institutions, deﬁned as the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction
(North, 1990, p. 3), play a fundamental role in societies. The extensive literature on insti-
tutions ﬁnds that good rules (e.g., sanctioning institutions and, more generally, the rule of
law) help societies solve social dilemmas and positively aﬀect many outcomes, such as pro-
ductive eﬀort and investments (Ostrom, Walker and Gardner, 1992; Acemoglu, Johnson and
Robinson, 2001). Diﬀerent societies may, however, implement diﬀerent rules and, as a con-
sequence, experience contrasting development paths (North and Thomas, 1973; Jones, 1981;
North, 1981; Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2005). These diﬀerences, in turn, can aﬀect
individuals' decisions to move between societies and, as observed in laboratory experiments,
eventually generate strong migration patterns (Gürerk, Irlenbusch and Rockenbach, 2006).
Migration ﬂows caused by diﬀerences in communities' ability to solve social dilemmas
might entail costs for both individuals and societies. First, because of social and family ties,
individuals can have preferences for their home society and would therefore bear a cost
from moving away from home (Hill, 1987; Niedomysl and Amcoﬀ, 2011). Second migration
can negatively aﬀect the sending society  and widen the welfare gap between this society
and the hosting one  by, for instance, depleting part of its workforce (Katseli, Lucas and
Xenogiani, 2006; Beine, Docquier and Rapoport, 2007; De Haas, 2010).1
Provided that heterogeneity in institutions is one of the factors driving migration ﬂows and
leading to inequalities between societies, analyzing whether and to what extent institutions
themselves can be a solution to these issues then becomes important. In this paper, we use
a laboratory experiment to investigate whether the possibility of individuals self-organizing
by choosing the institutions governing their interactions regulates migration ﬂows eﬃciently
and mitigates inequality between societies.
1The cost of migration for the sending society grows larger if positive spillovers exist between workers,
for instance in terms of productivity (see Katseli, Lucas and Xenogiani, 2006). Migration ﬂows can also have
(long-run) positive eﬀects on the sending society (De Haas, 2010) as well as positive and negative eﬀects on
the hosting society (Friedberg, 2001; Dinkelman and Schulhofer-Wohl, 2015). In this paper, we abstract from
these additional eﬀects.
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We focus on a particular set of institutions: sanctions. Recently, experimental economists
have devoted considerable attention to the emergence of sanctioning institutions (Kosfeld,
Okada and Riedl, 2009) and their impact on cooperation in public good games. Informal
(peer-to-peer) and formal (centralized) punishment mechanisms have been shown to sig-
niﬁcantly increase the level of cooperation (Ostrom, Walker and Gardner, 1992; Fehr and
Gächter, 2000, 2002; Gächter and Herrmann, 2009; Van der Heijden, Potters and Sefton,
2009; Gürerk, Irlenbusch and Rockenbach, 2009).2 We take this ﬁnding as a starting point
for our experimental design. In our baseline treatment, we employ a setting similar to Gür-
erk, Irlenbusch and Rockenbach (2006). At the beginning of the experiment, we randomly
allocate subjects to two groups to play a Public Goods Game (PGG). Subjects interact for 30
periods. One of the groups implements sanctioning institutions, whereas the other group has
no rules governing the interactions between its members. Every period, participants decide
whether to move between groups. Three main features distinguish our baseline from Gürerk,
Irlenbusch and Rockenbach (2006). First, we endow subjects with group-speciﬁc preferences;
that is, all else equal, subjects obtain higher payoﬀs in the group to which they are initially
allocated (initial group). Second, to account for the costs endured by a society as a result
of migration outﬂows, we make the individual return from the public good depend on the
group size. Third, we use formal rather than informal sanctioning institutions.
We compare this baseline with our main treatment, in which subjects also have the possi-
bility of voting at ﬁxed intervals on the institutions  either formal sanctions or no sanctions
 to be implemented in their group. We focus on endogenous institutional choice over exoge-
nously imposed institutions mainly because (i) imposing institutions is not always possible
in democratic societies, and (ii) institutions are more eﬀective when chosen by individuals
rather than exogenously implemented (Sutter, Haigner and Kocher, 2010; Baldassarri and
Grossman, 2011; Markussen, Putterman and Tyran, 2014).
Although the possibility of migrating and the interpretation of sanctioning institutions
2For a survey of this literature, see Chaudhuri (2011).
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as a bundle of local taxes and public goods link our paper to Tiebout (1956), our research
question diﬀers from that answered by Tiebout-like models. Rather than studying the eﬀect
of voting with feet on individuals' optimal sorting given preferences over taxation and public
goods provision, we study the eﬀect of the endogenous choice of institutions on individuals'
sorting given preferences for location.
We ﬁnd that the endogenous institutional choice dramatically aﬀects migration, individ-
ual welfare, and inequality patterns. Unlike the case in which individuals cannot vote on
institutions, groups that can choose the rules governing their interactions do not signiﬁcantly
diverge over time in terms of their size, composition, and contributions. On average, over
the 30 periods of the game, less than 73% of subjects play in their initial group when voting
is not allowed, with the group endowed with sanctioning institutions attracting most of the
subjects. By contrast, when institutional choice is allowed, a statistically signiﬁcant higher
share (83%) of subjects play in their initial group, with the majority (62%) voting to im-
plement sanctions by the end of the experiment. Group sizes are then more balanced when
subjects can vote on institutions than in the case in which institutions cannot be chosen. Re-
sults also show that although contributions are very similar with and without institutional
choice, the possibility of self-organizing leads to higher payoﬀs for individuals belonging to
an otherwise depopulated society, and a more equal distribution of payoﬀs between groups.
The individual-level analysis conﬁrms these ﬁndings and points out subjects' propensity to
move back to their initial group to cast their ballot, which further emphasizes their strong
ability to self-organize eﬃciently.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents a review of the literature. Section 3
describes the experimental design. Section 4 introduces a formal model and presents the main
theoretical predictions and the hypotheses to be tested in the empirical analysis. Section 5
reports and discusses our ﬁndings. Section 6 concludes.
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2 Literature Review
Our paper continues a stream of literature that studies both the eﬀect of institutions on
human cooperation and the evolutionary properties of sanctioning institutions.
Since the work of Yamagishi (1986) and Ostrom, Walker and Gardner (1992), many
scholars have investigated the role played by the possibility of punishing free-riders in fostering
cooperation in social dilemmas. Fehr and Gächter (2000, 2002) show individuals engage in
decentralized altruistic punishment  that is, they punish defectors at a cost to themselves
and in the absence of material gains  which leads to high levels of cooperation. Baldassarri
and Grossman (2011) study the eﬀectiveness of centralized forms of punishment (e.g., a
police force) in sustaining cooperation by using a lab in the ﬁeld experiment. The authors
show centralized sanctions enhance cooperation, especially when the centralized authority is
elected rather than randomly chosen.
Recently, increasing attention has been devoted to the endogenous choice of diﬀerent
types of decentralized institutions. Ertan, Page and Putterman (2009) study the adoption of
diﬀerent punishment technologies. The authors ﬁnd individuals tend to increasingly imple-
ment sanctioning institutions over time, and choose to punish only low contributors to the
public good. Sutter, Haigner and Kocher (2010) study the endogenous choice of sanctions and
rewards within a standard Voluntary Contribution Mechanism. They ﬁnd individuals choose
the rewarding or punishment options, as opposed to a sanction-free environment, when suf-
ﬁciently eﬀective; also, individuals tend to prefer to reward cooperation rather than punish
free-riding. An eﬀect of the endogenous choice of institutions is found: higher cooperation
levels arise when individuals endogenously choose the rules governing their interactions.
Because the presence of second-order free-riding and antisocial punishment lowers the
eﬀectiveness of peer-to-peer punishment (Denant-Boemont, Masclet and Noussair, 2007;
Dreber et al., 2008; Herrmann, Thöni and Gächter, 2008; Nikiforakis, 2008), a strand of
this literature focuses on the emergence of centralized forms of punishment. Andreoni and
Gee (2012) experimentally compare decentralized to centralized punishment and ﬁnd that in
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the vast majority of cases, subjects implement a centralized mechanism that crowds out the
peer-to-peer mechanism. Sigmund et al. (2010) theoretically show more centralized forms of
punishment (i.e., pool punishment) are more stable than peer punishment, because second-
order free-riding is also punished. The authors, however, ﬁnd pool punishment to be less
eﬃcient than peer punishment. Zhang et al. (2014) generally conﬁrm this prediction by
means of an experiment, even though they ﬁnd peer punishment to be more stable than
theoretically predicted. Traulsen, Röhl and Milinski (2012) argue a centralized punishment
is preferred to a decentralized one provided individuals are punished for not contributing to
the funding of centralized institutions.
Markussen, Putterman and Tyran (2014) also focus on individuals' dynamic choice of
punishment mechanisms. The authors experimentally analyze the conditions under which a
centralized punishment mechanism emerges as the preferred mechanism vis-à-vis an informal
mechanism as well as a sanction-free environment. They ﬁnd that, in line with social pref-
erences theories, a decentralized punishment mechanism is often preferred to a centralized
mechanism whenever the latter becomes suﬃciently costly (but proﬁtable). By contrast, a
centralized mechanism becomes the preferred choice when deterrent and suﬃciently cheap.3
As in Sutter, Haigner and Kocher (2010), the authors further conﬁrm the welfare-enhancing
eﬀect of the endogenous institutional choice.
Gross et al. (2016) analyze individuals' decisions to delegate punishment power to others.
The authors show hierarchical power structures emerge out of voluntary transfer of punish-
ment power to those members who are more willing to engage in decentralized punishment;
this process results in sustainable cooperation.
Our paper complements this literature by studying the evolution and regulatory properties
of sanctioning institutions when subjects can vote with both feet and ballots.
Subjects' ability to move between groups also links our paper to the literature on the re-
lationship between institutions and migration patterns. Gürerk, Irlenbusch and Rockenbach
3On the advantage of centralized forms of punishment over decentralized ones, see also Guala (2012).
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(2006) experimentally analyze a public goods game and show that, when confronted with a
sanction-free society, a society endowed with peer-to-peer punishment succeeds in attracting
all the subjects and sustaining cooperation. In a similar environment, Gürerk, Irlenbusch and
Rockenbach (2014) ﬁnd individuals' self-selection into the community implementing the pre-
ferred institutional framework is a key determinant of long-run cooperation. We mainly diﬀer
from Gürerk, Irlenbusch and Rockenbach (2006) in that we allow each group to endogenously
choose its preferred sanctioning regime.
Robbett (2014) studies a Tiebout-like environment in which (i) individuals are endowed
with preferences over bundles of local taxes and public good provision, and (ii) returns from
the public good increase with community size. The author ﬁnds that, when unable to vote on
their preferred bundle, individuals tend to sort optimally but fail to achieve full eﬃciency due
to over-segregation in communities providing a Pareto-dominated bundle; this ineﬃciency is
overcome when individuals can vote on bundles. Our research question is related to but
diﬀers from that answered by Tiebout-like models because, as noted before, we focus on the
eﬀect of the endogenous choice of institutions on individuals' sorting given preferences for
location.
3 Experimental Design and Procedures
We conducted laboratory experiments at the University of Exeter between February and
October 2016. Participants were mainly students of economics, business administration, and
engineering, but other disciplines were also represented. We ran two diﬀerent treatments with
a total of 50 sessions, 25 sessions per treatment. Each session was composed of 10 subjects;
the average individual earnings were £14. All instructions can be found in Appendix A.
The experiment comprises two diﬀerent activities. Upon arrival to the laboratory, subjects
are randomly divided into two groups  A and B  of ﬁve people each. In the ﬁrst activity,
each subject receives 50 tokens and participates in a standard one-shot PGG. At the end of
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the ﬁrst activity, subjects receive the instructions for the second task, which consists of a
PGG that lasts 30 periods. No information about the outcome of the ﬁrst activity is released.
Treatments for the second activity diﬀer depending on whether the institutional setting is
endogenously chosen.
In Treatment 1 (No-Voting  Moving), subjects are randomly assigned in the ﬁrst period
to one of two groups  A and B  of ﬁve people each. The group to which each subject is
allocated in the ﬁrst period is her initial group. In each period, each subject is endowed
with 50 tokens to be allocated between a group and a private account. As Table 1 shows, the
subject's return from an allocation to the group account depends on the size of the group
the subject is located in, and on whether this group is the subject's initial group.
Table 1: Individual returns to the public good
by group size and membership
Group Size (n)
Factor If Subject Is Factor If Subject Is
In Her Initial Group Not In Her Initial Group
1 1.00 1.00
2 1.50 1.15
3 1.75 1.40
4 2.00 1.65
5 2.25 1.90
6 2.25 1.90
7 2.25 1.90
8 2.25 1.90
9 2.25 1.90
10 2.25 1.90
There exist two institutional settings (rule-sets) aﬀecting subjects' payoﬀs.
(a) Under Rule-Set 1, sanctioning institutions are not in place and individual i's per-period
monetary payoﬀ is
pi
i,h
= (50− C
i
) +
R
h
(n)
n
n∑
j=1
C
j
(1)
for i, j = 1, ..., n, where n denotes the total number of individuals located in the group,
C
i
∈ [0, 50] denotes i's contribution to the group account, and Rh (n)
n
represents the
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marginal per-capita return (MPCR) from the group account for individual i whose
initial group is h = A,B, with values for R
h
(n) shown in Table 1.
(b) Under Rule-Set 2, sanctions are in place. Each individual in the group has to pay a
ﬁxed fee of 15 tokens per period. In addition, each individual pays a ﬁne equal to 80%
of the amount of tokens allocated to the private account in a particular period. The
ﬁxed fee and the ﬁne (if applicable) are deducted from subjects' monetary payoﬀ at the
end of the period. Under Rule-Set 2, i's per-period monetary payoﬀ is therefore
pi
i,h
= (50− C
i
)(1− 0.8) + Rh(n)
n
(
n∑
j=1
C
j
)− 15. (2)
In Treatment 1, Group A implements Rule-Set 1 and Group B implements Rule-Set 2 for
the entire duration of the game.
At the end of each period, subjects receive information about (i) the average contribution
to the group account in their current group, (ii) the average contribution in the other group,
(iii) the rule-set implemented in their current group, and (iv) the rule-set implemented in
the other group. Subjects then decide whether to move from their current group.
In Treatment 2 (Voting  Moving), besides deciding the contribution to the group
account and whether to move between groups, subjects also vote on the rule-set to be imple-
mented.
In the ﬁrst ﬁve periods, Group A implements Rule-Set 1, and Group B implements
Rule-Set 2. Starting from period t = 6, subjects vote every 5 periods on the rule-set to be
implemented in their current group (i.e., the group in which they play in that particular
period, which may diﬀer from their initial group). Subjects therefore vote ﬁve times in total
throughout a session. Information about the rule-set chosen by the majority of voters is
publicly released to all subjects; the rule-set is implemented immediately after voting and
applies until the next voting round.4
4In case the two rule-sets receive the same number of votes, the rule-set for the group is randomly chosen.
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4 Setup
In this section, we present the model setup and derive the theoretical predictions arising
from our setting. We consider two groups composed of n
g
individuals, with g = A,B,
denoting the group index, and where N = n
A
+n
B
represents the total number of individuals
in our economy. Individuals play a PGG for a ﬁnite number of periods T .
In each period t ∈ [1, T ], players ﬁrst simultaneously choose their contribution to the
production of the public good, and then simultaneously decide whether to move between
groups. Contributions can occur under two regimes. In the sanction-free regime, individual
i's contribution C
i
∈ [0, E] is voluntary, where E denotes i's endowment, for i = 1, ..., N . In
the sanctioning institutions regime, i's contribution is subject to a ﬁne equal to a fraction
s ∈ (0, 1] of the endowment she does not allocate to the public good.
Unlike in Treatment 1, individuals in Treatment 2 vote every k periods on whether to
implement formal sanctions in their group (g). Voting occurs at the beginning of the period,
and contributions are chosen once the outcome of majority voting is implemented and made
publicly known.
Sanctioning institutions and contributions to the public good are local, and no spillovers
exist between groups. The cost of sanctioning institutions is proportional to the size of the
group: each individual playing under sanctioning institutions must contribute a ﬁxed amount
c to its provision (e.g., to fund law courts and police forces).
Let h deﬁne individuals' initial group; that is, the group i is allocated to in t = 1, for
h = A,B. We assume each group has n
h
= n
∗
initial group members, with n
A
+ n
B
= N .5
We denote by n˜
g ∈ [0, n∗ ] the number of members in g who are also initial group members,
for g = A,B.
In the absence of sanctions, the per-period monetary payoﬀ of individual i, with initial
5Whenever h and g are employed, we adopt the convention of reporting individuals' location as a super-
script and individuals' initial group as a subscript.
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group h and located in group g of size n
g
, is
pi
g
i,h
= (E − Cg
i,h
) +
R
g
i,h
(n
g
)
ng
n
g∑
j=1
C
g
j
(3)
for i, j = 1, ..., n
g
, and h, g = A,B. In (3), r
g
i,h
(n
g
) ≡ R
g
i,h
(n
g
)
n
g represents the MPCR from the
public good, where R
g
i,h
(·) multiplies i's share of the public good to capture the social utility
of the public good provision, for h, g = A,B. We assume the following:
A1: R
g
i,h
(n
g
) is non-decreasing in n
g
and attains its maximum at n
g
= n
∗
, for h, g = A,B.
A2: 1/n
g ≤ rg
i,h
(n
g
) ≤ 1 for i = 1, ..., ng , and h, g = A,B.
A3: R
h
i,h
(n) > R
g
i,h
(n) (and therefore r
h
i,h
(n) > r
g
i,h
(n)), where R
h
i,h
(1) < R
g
i,h
(N), for h, g =
A,B and h 6= g, and for n = 1, ..., N .
From A1, the social beneﬁt from the provision of the public good  relative to its cost
 increases with the group size up to n
∗
and remains constant for n
g ∈ (n∗ , N ]. A1 may,
for instance, reﬂect economies of scale in the production of the public good (e.g., education).
A2 gives rise to a social dilemma: in (3), (self-interested) i has an incentive to free-ride
and contribute C
g
i,h
= 0, whereas eﬃciency requires C
g
i,h
= E, for h, g = A,B. A3 captures
i's disutility from not residing in h. However, the last inequality in A3 implies the initial
group premium is not suﬃciently high to compensate i for living in a largely depopulated
h. Together, A1-A3 imply a socially eﬃcient partition of individuals between groups: for
any given level of (group) contribution, the public good is most beneﬁcial to a society when
each individual resides in her initial group; that is, n
g
= n˜
g
= n
∗
, for g = A,B.
When g adopts sanctions, the per-period monetary payoﬀ of individual i, with initial
group h and located in g, is given by
pi
g
i,h
(s) = (E − Cg
i,h
)(1− s) + R
g
i,h
(n
g
)
ng
 ng∑
j=1
C
g
j
− c. (4)
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We assume sanctions are deterrent ; that is, they make it individually rational to contribute
the entire endowment to the public good:
A4: s > (1− rg
i,h
(n
g
)), ∀ng , for h, g = A,B.6
Following Markussen, Putterman and Tyran (2014), we deﬁne Pg
i,h
(n
g
) = R
g
i,h
(n
g
)E − E
as the cooperation premium, that is, the increment in the earnings of i with initial group
h and located in g due to the presence of formal sanctions.7 The cooperation premium is
individual-speciﬁc: it increases as (a) an individual joins her initial group, and (b) the group
size rises toward the eﬃcient size n
∗
. We assume:
A5: c < Pg
i,h
(n
g
) if n
g
> n
g
h
, for h, g = A,B, where n
∗
> n
g
h
> n
h
h
, for g 6= h.
FromA5, when individuals free-ride absent formal sanctions, implementing a formal-sanction
scheme generates a net beneﬁt for an individual provided the group size is larger than the
threshold n
g
h
. Because the sanctions' cooperation premium increases when the individual
resides in her initial group, we have n
g
h
> n
h
h
, for g 6= h.
4.1 Predictions under Selﬁsh Preferences
We now derive the equilibrium predictions arising from our setting, assuming it is common
knowledge that all individuals are self-interested and rational. We ﬁrst discuss individual
contribution, migration and, for Treatment 2, voting behavior. We then present equilibrium
predictions for Treatment 1 (which oﬀers no possibility of voting) and Treatment 2 (in which
subjects can vote on sanctioning institutions).
6From Table 1, A4 is marginally violated for individuals not located in their initial group when n
g
= N ,
for g = A,B  the diﬀerence between the left-hand side and the right-hand side in A4 being 0.01. This
discrepancy aﬀects only one equilibrium prediction (see point (a) in the Strong Nash Stable Equilibrium
described below) in terms of the contribution of individuals not located in their initial group (because it
predicts a zero contribution), but not in terms of location and voting behavior. However, we ﬁnd no evidence
of sanctions being non-deterrent in the case in which subjects are all located in one group. For the sake of
simplicity, we therefore present a theoretical analysis based on A4.
7We deﬁne earnings as the individual monetary payoﬀ net of the cost of formal sanctions. Notice our
deﬁnition of P assumes individuals are self-interested and therefore do not contribute to the public good
absent formal sanctions.
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4.1.1 Contribution
From A2, absent sanctioning institutions, individual i contributes C
g
i,h
= 0, for i =
1, ..., n
g
, and h, g = A,B. Also, from A4, individual i contributes C
g
i,h
= E in the presence
of sanctions, for i = 1, ..., n
g
, and h, g = A,B.
4.1.2 Migration
Let n
g
t
denote the size of g in period t. Also, let m
g
i,h,t
be an indicator taking the value 1
if individual i, whose initial group is h, decides to move from her current group g in period
t, and 0 otherwise, for h, g = A,B and i = 1, ..., n
g
t
.
Remark 1. Absent sanctioning institutions in both groups, an individual is indiﬀerent be-
tween her initial group and the non-initial group.
Remark 2. Suppose only group B is endowed with formal sanctions in t + 1. If i, for
i = 1, ..., n
A
t
, is located in her initial group A and believes n
B
t+1
> n
B
A
(resp., n
B
t+1
≤ nB
A
),
thenm
A
i,A,t
= 1 (resp., m
A
i,A,t
= 0). Similarly, if i, for i = 1, ..., n
B
t
, is located in her initial
group B and believes n
B
t+1
≤ nB
B
(resp., n
B
t+1
> n
B
B
), then m
B
i,B,t
= 1 (resp., m
B
i,B,t
= 0).
Remark 3. If both groups implement sanctioning institutions, individuals obtain the highest
payoﬀ when located in their initial group.
By migrating, individuals express preferences for the public good provision and/or groups.
Voting with feet is, however, powerless absent sanctions, because neither of the two groups
contributes to the public good (Remark 1).
When only one group implements sanctioning institutions, diﬀerent beliefs support dif-
ferent migration patterns. In particular, from Remark 2, because the sanctions' cooperation
premium (Pg
i,h
) increases with the group size, subjects may ﬁnd it individually rational to
move to the group in which all the other subjects are located, regardless of the sanctioning
regime implemented.
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This statement also holds when both groups implement formal sanctions (Remark 3). In
this case, however, each subject can ﬁnd it individually rational to settle in her initial group
if other subjects do so as well.
4.1.3 Voting
From A5, a threshold n
g
h
exists for h, g = A,B, such that voting for sanctions is a
dominant strategy if n
g
> n
g
h
, where n
g
h
> n
h
h
, for g 6= h.
Remark 4. All else equal, when playing in her initial group, an individual enjoys a higher
cooperation premium from sanctioning institutions. Therefore, individuals are more
likely to vote in favor of sanctioning institutions when located in their initial group.
4.1.4 Equilibrium Outcomes
Treatment 1. When voting on institutions is not allowed and only Group B is endowed
with sanctioning institutions, the following equilibria exist.
Nash Equilibria with Exogenous Institutions. In Treatment 1, two equilibria exist in
which all individuals are located in either Group A or Group B. Individuals contribute
to the public good only when located in the group implementing sanctions (Group B).
Hence, the equilibrium in which all individuals are located in Group B is Pareto-
dominant.
Because we expect the Pareto-dominant equilibrium to arise, we have the following hy-
pothesis:
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Hypothesis 1. In Treatment 1, we expect:
(1.1 ) Group B to become overpopulated relative to Group A by attracting A's initial
members;
(1.2 ) subjects to contribute more when sanctioning institutions are in place;
(1.3 ) payoﬀ inequality to emerge both (i) between groups and (ii) within the overpopu-
lated group (Group B), between its initial and non-initial members.
Treatment 2. In Treatment 2, only Group B implements sanctioning institutions in t =
1, ..., k1 − 1, where k1 < T denotes the ﬁrst voting round. Voting occurs at regular intervals
of k periods: the ﬁrst voting round occurs at the beginning of period k1 ≡ k + 1. Following
Robbett (2014), we focus on Nash stable and strong Nash stable partitions of individuals.8 A
partition is Nash stable if no individual can obtain a higher payoﬀ from unilaterally moving
to a diﬀerent group. A partition is strong Nash stable if no coalition of agents exists in which
all weakly prefer coalitionally moving to a diﬀerent group, with at least one member of the
coalition being strictly better oﬀ.
Nash Stable Equilibria. In Treatment 2, two Nash Stable equilibria exist in which all in-
dividuals are located in either Group A or Group B in t = 2, no migration occurs in
the remaining periods, all individuals vote in favor of formal sanctions in every vot-
ing round, and individuals contribute to the public good only when located in the group
implementing sanctions.
Initial migration driven by beliefs and, possibly, diﬀerent institutional settings between
groups may lead to ineﬃcient outcomes. When all subjects are located in one group, none
of them ﬁnds it individually rational to migrate further (Remark 2). The two groups then
diverge in terms of welfare, as one group becomes fully depopulated. Also, payoﬀ inequality
8On equilibrium selection in Tiebout models, see Greenberg and Weber (1986) and Conley and Konishi
(2002).
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within the populated group arises as the initial group members obtain higher returns from
the public good.
Strong Nash Stable Equilibrium. In Treatment 2, a Strong Nash Stable equilibrium ex-
ists in which
(a) individuals contribute 0 (resp., E) when located in a sanction-free group (resp., in
a group implementing sanctions);
(b) all individuals are located in Group B in t = 2, ..., k1 − 1;
(c) all individuals whose initial group is A move to Group A at the end of period
t = k1 − 1;
(d) in t = k1, all individuals vote in favor of formal sanctions;
(e) no migration occurs from t = k1 onward, and all individuals vote in favor of
sanctioning institutions in all subsequent voting rounds.
The Strong Nash Stable Equilibrium describes the Pareto-dominant outcome that is made
possible by endogenous institutional choice. Subjects initially move to the group implement-
ing sanctioning institutions to enjoy the eﬃcient provision of the public good. Right before
the ﬁrst voting round  that is, in the pre-voting period  individuals located outside their
initial group coalitionally move and implement sanctioning institutions in their initial group.
Once both groups are endowed with sanctioning institutions, this eﬃcient partition of indi-
viduals becomes the unique strong Nash stable partition. This equilibrium also eradicates
payoﬀ inequalities both between and within groups.9
Because the Strong Nash Stable Equilibrium is Pareto-dominant, we expect this equilib-
rium to arise. Therefore, we have the following hypothesis:
9Because groups are populated by initial members only, there is no inequality within groups.
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Hypothesis 2. In Treatment 2, we expect:
(2.1 ) groups to converge toward the eﬃcient partition of individuals; that is, the majority
of subjects are located in their initial group;
(2.2 ) the majority of subjects to vote for sanctioning institutions;
(2.3 ) subjects to contribute more when sanctioning institutions are in place;
(2.4 ) no payoﬀ inequality between groups;
(2.5 ) subjects located outside their initial group to be more likely to move back in the
pre-voting period (vis-à-vis other periods).
4.2 Predictions under Social Preferences
We brieﬂy present some of the consequences of assigning social preferences  e.g., prefer-
ences for reciprocity and/or eﬃciency (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Charness and Rabin, 2002) 
to individuals for equilibrium dynamics, as a formal analysis proves particularly cumbersome
in the presence of migration.10
In Treatment 2, social preferences can give rise to the following equilibrium prediction.
Equilibrium under Social Preferences. Suppose social preferences stabilize cooperation
at a suﬃciently high level in both groups absent sanctioning institutions. Then, in
Treatment 2, an equilibrium exists in which individuals are eﬃciently located in their
sanction-free initial groups.
This equilibrium describes a particularly eﬃcient result: individuals contribute to the
public good in their initial group without incurring the cost of sanctioning institutions. This
equilibrium can arise in the presence of a suﬃciently strong aversion to advantageous in-
equality (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999) and/or a suﬃciently strong preference for social welfare
and overall eﬃciency (Charness and Rabin, 2002).
10For a formal discussion of the impact of social preferences on individuals' voting behavior on formal
sanctioning institutions in the absence of migration, see Markussen, Putterman and Tyran (2014).
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5 Results
We start by comparing the dynamic and convergence results of the game attained when
subjects can only move between groups (No-Voting-Moving) to those attained when subjects
can decide on both the rule-sets and their location (Voting-Moving). We then examine the
main determinants of subjects' contribution, migration, and voting decisions.
5.1 Dynamics and Convergence
Dynamics. We start with an overview of groups' dynamics in the two treatments. The
top (bottom) panel in Figure 1 plots the average size of Groups A and B over time in the
No-Voting-Moving (Voting-Moving) treatment. The ﬁgure further discriminates between
subjects whose current group is/is not their initial group.
Similar to Gürerk, Irlenbusch and Rockenbach (2006), in the No-Voting-Moving treat-
ment (NVM henceforth), Group A  in which no sanctioning institutions are in place 
becomes depopulated over time, whereas Group B  in which sanctions are in place  be-
comes overpopulated. As the top panels of Figure 1 show, the size of Group A goes from ﬁve
members in the initial period to about two members on average in the last ﬁve periods of the
experiment.11 At the same time, Group B increases from ﬁve members in the initial period
to almost eight members on average in the last ﬁve periods.12 As a result, the average size
of Group A is signiﬁcantly lower than that of Group B.13
The upper panels in Figure 1 also reveal the composition of both groups varies throughout
the experiment. In particular, Group B increases in size by attracting individuals who were
initially allocated to Group A. In the ﬁrst ﬁve periods, only 18.7% of the subjects initially
allocated to Group A (0.94 subjects on average) are located in Group B. By the last ﬁve
periods, that percentage grows to 59.4% (2.97 subjects), a statistically signiﬁcant increase
11Diﬀerences are statistically signiﬁcant (Wilcoxon signed rank test: z=4.20, p=0.00, two-tailed).
12Diﬀerences are statistically signiﬁcant (z=-4.19, p=0.00, two-tailed).
13The average size of Group A over the 30 periods is 3.15 across all sessions, while it is 6.85 for Group B.
Diﬀerences are statistically signiﬁcant (Wilcoxon signed rank test: z=-4.37, p=0.00, two-tailed).
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Figure 1: Distribution of participants across groups over time, by treatment. Lighter
(darker) portions of the vertical bars represent the average number of individuals for whom their cur-
rent group is (is not) their initial group. Solid lines represent locally weighted scatterplot smoothing
curves ﬁtted to the data. The dashed horizontal lines represent the situation in which participants
are equally distributed between Group A and Group B.
(Wilcoxon signed rank test: z=4.21, p=0.00, two-tailed). These results support Hypothesis
1.1.
The bottom panels in Figure 1 show a more equal distribution of subjects between Group
A and Group B in the Voting-Moving treatment (VM henceforth) than in NVM. The two
treatments diﬀer both in the size and composition of the groups. First, in VM, the average
number of members in both Group A and Group B is close to ﬁve, and remains quite stable
over the course of the experiment. The average number of members in each group in the
ﬁrst ﬁve periods is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from that in the last ﬁve periods (Wilcoxon
signed rank test: z=1.20, p=0.24 for Group A, and z=-1.16, p=0.25 for Group B, two-
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tailed). Second, most of the members in Group A and Group B play in their initial groups.
On average, 78% (88%) of subjects whose initial group is Group A (B) play in Group A
(B), and these proportions do not vary signiﬁcantly over the 30 periods of the experiment:
the p-value for a permutation test for repeated measures (Pesarin and Salmaso, 2010) is
0.11. Altogether, 83% of subjects in VM are located in their initial group in any given
period, in accordance with Hypothesis 2.1. The corresponding percentage for NVM (72.7%)
is signiﬁcantly lower (Mann-Whitney test: z=-3.23, p=0.00, two-tailed).
To better understand the diﬀerences in the size and composition of groups between NVM
and VM, Figure 2 looks at subjects' migration behavior. The left panel plots the average
share of subjects moving between groups in each treatment; the right panel distinguishes
moves toward groups that implement sanctions from moves toward sanction-free groups.
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Figure 2: Migration patterns under the Voting-Moving and No-Voting-Moving treat-
ments. The left panel plots the average percentage of moves between groups over time. Black (gray)
dots represent the proportion of moves in each period for VM (NVM ); solid lines represent locally
weighted scatterplot smoothing curves ﬁtted to the data. The right panel plots the proportion of
moves away from/toward groups implementing sanctions  out of the total number of group shifts
 under VM (black bars) and NVM (gray bars). For VM, the sample in the right panel comprises
only periods-sessions in which the rule-sets implemented by Group A and Group B diﬀer.
As shown in the left panel, the percentage of subjects who move between groups over
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the course of the experiment in NVM (14.76%) is larger than in VM (11.52%), and this
diﬀerence is statistically signiﬁcant (Mann-Whitney test: z=1.97, p<0.05, two-tailed).14
The right panel shows subjects are more likely to move toward groups that implement
sanctions. Considering only those periods/sessions in VM in which the two groups implement
diﬀerent rule-sets (ca. 41% of the observations), we ﬁnd 55.7% of the movements go from
sanction-free groups to groups implementing sanctions, while 44.3% of the movements go in
the opposite direction. In NVM, the corresponding ﬁgures are 52.9% and 47.1%, respectively.
In both treatments, the proportion of movements toward sanctioning institutions is signiﬁ-
cantly higher than the proportion of movements away from institutions (exact binomial test:
p=0.02 for VM, p=0.05 for NVM, two-tailed).
Overall, whereas the right panel of Figure 2 points to quite similar migration choices in
NVM and VM, Figure 1 shows the dynamics in terms of groups' size and composition diﬀer
substantially between treatments. We attribute this diﬀerence to the ability of subjects to
vote for their preferred institutions in VM.
Next, we analyze subjects' contribution to the public good over time, because this analy-
sis can help account for subjects' propensity to move toward groups endowed with sanctions.
As Figure 3 shows, in both NVM and VM, the average contribution in sanction-free groups
is signiﬁcantly lower than in groups implementing sanctions. In NVM, the average contri-
butions in groups with and without sanctions are 45.67 and 20.55 tokens, respectively; in
VM, the corresponding values are 46.61 and 24.75. These diﬀerences are statistically signif-
icant (Wilcoxon signed rank test: z=4.37, p=0.00 for NVM and z=4.37, p=0.00 for VM,
two-tailed), consistent with Hypotheses 1.2 and 2.3.
Finally, Figure 4 analyzes subjects' average payoﬀs over time in the two treatments. In
NVM, the average per-period payoﬀs are 67.30 for Group A members and 82.17 for Group
B members, a statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence (Wilcoxon signed rank test: z=4.34, p=0.00,
14We also compared the proportion of movers under NVM and VM using a permutation test, which
imposes fewer assumptions and has higher power than the Mann-Whitney test (Pesarin and Salmaso, 2010).
The null hypothesis of no diﬀerence between treatments is again rejected (p-value=0.01, two-tailed).
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Figure 3: Average group contribution per period, by institutional setting and treat-
ment. The left (right) panel plots the average contribution for groups without (with) sanctioning
institutions. In both cases, black (gray) dots represent the mean contribution per period under the
VM (NVM ) treatment; solid lines represent locally weighted scatterplot smoothing curves ﬁtted to
the data.
two-tailed). Furthermore, among subjects located in Group B, the average payoﬀ of initial
Group B members (87.84) is signiﬁcantly higher than that of non-initial members (72.41)
(Wilcoxon signed rank test: z=4.37, p=0.00, two-tailed). Both results support Hypothesis
1.3.
In VM, the average per-period payoﬀs for Group A and Group B members are 81.18
and 85.15, respectively. Even though this diﬀerence is also signiﬁcant (Wilcoxon signed
rank test: z=2.27, p=0.02, two-tailed), contradicting Hypothesis 2.4, the disparity in payoﬀs
between groups is signiﬁcantly lower than in NVM (Mann-Whitney test: z=-4.26, p=0.00,
two-tailed), suggesting that subjects' ability to vote on sanctioning institutions leads to more
equal societies. Moreover, the average payoﬀ across both groups in VM (84.07) is signiﬁcantly
higher than in NVM (78.47) (Mann-Whitney test: z=2.80, p=0.00, two-tailed), indicating
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Figure 4: Average participant payoﬀ per period, by current group and treatment. Black
(gray) dots represent the average payoﬀ per period of those subjects located in Groups A and B
in each period, under the VM (NVM ) treatment; solid lines represent locally weighted scatterplot
smoothing curves ﬁtted to the data.
the ability to choose institutions increases overall eﬃciency.
In the following subsection we analyze the stability of our results by investigating groups'
convergence.
Convergence. We focus on two main dimensions of convergence. We deﬁne convergence
in groups in period γ as the situation in which, given a particular composition of groups in
a given session, at most one subject moves between groups each period from γ onward. We
also deﬁne convergence in institutions in period τ  as the situation in which neither group
changes its institutional setting from τ onward in a given session. Finally, we deﬁne double
convergence in periods γ and τ  as the situation in which convergence in groups is achieved
by period γ and convergence in institutions is achieved by period τ .
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The upper part of Table 2 shows, for each treatment, the percentage of sessions achieving
group convergence at least three periods before the end of the experiment (i.e., by period
γ = 27 or earlier), the average time of convergence, and the average percentage of subjects
who play in their initial group from the convergence period onwards.15
Table 2: Convergence in groups and convergence in institutions
No-Voting-Moving Voting-Moving
Convergence in Groups (γ = 27)
Converging Sessions (%) 52.00 48.00
Average Convergence Time 22.92 19.75
Subjects in Initial Group (%) 68.97 96.39
Convergence in Institutions (τ = 22)
Converging Sessions (%) 68.00
Average Convergence Time 11.00
Two Groups with Sanctions" (%) 52.00
Two Groups without Sanctions" (%) 24.00
One Group with/without Sanctions" (%) 24.00
In NVM, 52% of the sessions converge in groups by period 27. On average, sessions
that converge in groups do so in ca. 23 periods. In line with the predictions of the Nash
Equilibria with Exogenous Institutions, the groups' composition is far from eﬃciency (68.97%
of subjects play in their initial group). In VM, we observe similar results to those in NVM
in terms of the percentage of converging sessions (48%) and their convergence time (19.75
periods). However, when convergence occurs, the two groups are almost entirely populated
by their initial members (96.39% of subjects play in their initial group). In line with the
predictions of the Strong Nash Stable Equilibrium, this ﬁnding points to subjects' ability to
converge toward the eﬃcient partition of individuals between groups in VM.
The lower part of Table 2 displays the results for the convergence in institutions. For
this type of convergence, we report the results for VM only, because subjects cannot vote in
NVM. The table shows that almost 70% of the sessions converge in institutions by period 22
15The main conclusions drawn from Table 2 remain broadly similar for alternative values of γ.
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(the next-to-last voting period) and that the average convergence time is 11 periods.
The table also reports the percentage of sessions that converge to each possible combina-
tion of institutions in the two groups. In the majority of the cases (52%) in which there is
convergence in institutions by period 22, both groups converge to implementing sanctions.
This result is in line with the predictions of the Strong Nash Stable Equilibrium under selﬁsh
preferences and, in particular, supports Hypothesis 2.2. However, we also observe 24% of ses-
sions converging to both groups not implementing sanctions. This observation is consistent
with the equilibrium under social preferences described in Section 4.2.
Finally, 24% of the sessions converge to two groups implementing diﬀerent institutions
(i.e., only one group implements sanctions). These sessions do not behave in accordance with
the equilibria described in Sections 4.1 and 4.2.
5.2 Individual Behavior
To better understand the mechanisms underlying the group-level patterns reported above,
this section presents individual-level analyses of contribution, migration, and voting decisions,
focusing primarily on our main treatment (VM ).16
Contribution. The ﬁrst column of Table 3 reports the marginal eﬀects from a (doubly)
censored regression model (Greene, 2012) in which the dependent variable is the individual
contribution of subject i in period t.17 We have the following explanatory variables: Is
Punishingg,t, a binary covariate that equals 1 if a sanctioning mechanism is in place in i's
current group g, and 0 otherwise; Initial Groupi,t, a dummy taking the value 1 if i is located
in the group she was allocated to at the beginning of the experiment, and 0 otherwise; Group
Contributiong[−i],t−1, the average contribution of the other members of i's current group in
16For ease of exposition, we estimate the models and present results for each of these outcomes separately.
The ﬁndings reported below are generally similar if we ﬁt panel dynamic simultaneous equations models, even
though standard estimation approaches (e.g., Akashi and Kunitomo, 2012; Hsiao and Zhou, 2015) require
ignoring the censoring of contributions and the dichotomous nature of migration and voting decisions.
17Raw parameter estimates  representing the eﬀect of the predictors on the uncensored latent variable
 are reported in the Appendix (Table A.1).
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period t − 1; and abs(Group Sizeg,t - 5), the absolute value of the diﬀerence between 5 and
the number of members in i's current group, measuring the impact of deviations from the
optimal group size on individual contributions. The model also includes subject and period
random eﬀects to account for time-invariant individual heterogeneity and common temporal
shocks aﬀecting all subjects, along with session and group random intercepts to control for
potential session eﬀects (Fréchette, 2012) and contemporaneous correlation between same-
group members (Poen, 2009).18
Individual contributions to the public account increase signiﬁcantly when subjects be-
long to a group that implements sanctioning institutions. This result suggests participants
generally understood the mechanism at play and responded to incentives, and reinforces the
group-level evidence in support of Hypothesis 2.3. Also, everything else equal, average indi-
vidual contributions are signiﬁcantly higher when subjects play in their initial group. This
ﬁnding again is consistent with incentives, because the returns to contributions to the public
account are higher when participants remain in their initial group than when they are in
the other group. Participants also tend to contribute more after observing higher contribu-
tion levels from their fellow group members in the previous period. On the other hand, i's
contribution drops when the size of her group deviates from 5.
Column (2) repeats the speciﬁcation in column (1), but accommodates possible asym-
metric impacts that deviations from the optimal group size might have on subjects' contri-
butions. We disaggregate abs(Group Sizeg,t - 5) into 1(Group Sizeg,t<5)(5 - Group Sizeg,t)
and 1(Group Sizeg,t>5)(Group Sizeg,t - 5), where 1(A) is the indicator function taking the
value 1 if A is true, and 0 otherwise. The coeﬃcients for both variables are negative and
statistically signiﬁcant, indicating that any deviation from 5 is systematically associated with
a drop in individual contributions.
To account for autocorrelation and for subjects' tendency to adjust their contributions
18The results are generally similar for ﬁxed-eﬀects censored regression models estimated using Dhaene and
Jochmans (2015)'s split-panel jackknife approach to correct for incidental parameter bias, as well as using
Honoré (1992)'s semiparametric estimator. See Table A.2 in the Appendix.
26
Table 3
Determinants of individual contributions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Is Punishingg,t 13.86
∗∗∗ 13.82∗∗∗ 12.93∗∗∗ 10.82∗∗∗
(0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (1.30)
Initial Groupi,t 1.73
∗∗∗ 1.77∗∗∗ 1.36∗∗∗ 0.51∗
(0.31) (0.32) (0.31) (0.31)
Group Contributiong[−i],t−1 0.13∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗ -0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
abs(Group Sizeg,t - 5) -0.36
∗∗∗ -0.29∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗∗
(0.10) (0.09) (0.10)
1(Group Sizeg,t<5)(5 - Group Sizeg,t) -0.47
∗∗∗
(0.16)
1(Group Sizeg,t>5)(Group Sizeg,t - 5) -0.33
∗∗∗
(0.11)
Contributioni,t−1 0.14∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01)
Observations 7,250 7,250 7,250 7,250
Log likelihood -24,993.46 -24,987.21 -23,777.47 -24,246.43
Notes. The table reports marginal eﬀects for the covariates included in the panel models for individual contribu-
tions. The dependent variable is left-censored at 0 and right-censored at 50. Units of observation are individuals-
per-period. All speciﬁcations include subject, period, group, and session random eﬀects. Standard errors are
presented in parentheses. Signiﬁcance levels: ∗∗∗ at 1%, ∗∗ at 5%, ∗ at 10%.
over time (Smith, 2013), column (3) incorporates the lag of the dependent variable among
the regressors of the column (1) speciﬁcation. The estimate for Contribution i,t−1 indicates
that roughly 14% of subject i's contribution in period t is explained by her contribution
in the previous period. Nonetheless, the substantive conclusions emerging from the static
models remain unchanged, although the association between Contributioni,t and the other
explanatory variables  and in particular, the marginal eﬀect of Group Contributiong[−i],t−1
 becomes weaker.
Consistent with the results for VM, the estimates in column (4)  which replicates the
column (3) speciﬁcation for NVM  show again signiﬁcant persistence in individuals' propen-
sity to cooperate, which is further strengthened by sanctioning institutions. However, the
previous contributions of other members of i's current group do not have a systematic in-
ﬂuence on Contribution i,t when subjects are not allowed to choose the rule-set governing
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their interactions, whereas the impact of deviations from the optimal group size goes in the
opposite direction.19
Migration. We now study the main determinants of subjects' migration decisions. Column
(1) of Table 4 reports marginal eﬀects obtained from a panel probit model ﬁtted to data from
our main treatment. The dependent variable is Migration i,t, a dummy taking the value 1 if
subject i moved between groups in period t, and 0 otherwise. We include as predictors of the
moving decision the same set of explanatory variables used in the analysis of individual con-
tributions, replacing Group Contributiong[−i] with Contributioni,t - Group Contributiong[−i],t,
the diﬀerence between i's contribution and the average contribution of the other group mem-
bers in period t.20 The model also incorporates subject-speciﬁc (correlated) random eﬀects
(Wooldridge, 2005, 2010) as well as period, group, and session random intercepts.21
All the covariates in the model have a statistically signiﬁcant impact on Migration i,t. All
else equal, subjects are less likely to move if they are located in their initial group and if
their current group has adopted a sanctioning institution. On the other hand, the larger
the diﬀerence between i's contribution and the average contribution of other members of her
group in period t, the higher the probability that she moves. Also, the probability that the
average subject moves in any given period rises when the number of members of her group
deviates from its optimal size.22
19To account for the potential endogeneity of covariates and allow for dynamic feedback from the out-
come to the explanatory variables, Table A.3 in the Appendix replicates all the analyses in Table 3 using
Fernández-Val and Vella (2011)'s two-step estimator for non-linear panel data models. The main results
remain qualitatively similar, although deviations from the optimal group size are no longer signiﬁcant in VM.
20Recall that individuals choose the amount of their contributions before deciding whether to move. This
variable is not included in the models for individual contributions because of obvious collinearity problems
in the dynamic speciﬁcations.
21Parameter estimates are reported in the Appendix (Table A.4). For robustness, we also ﬁtted two-way
(subject and period) ﬁxed-eﬀects probit models using the method developed by Fernández-Val and Weidner
(2016). The estimates are aligned with those from the random eﬀects models (see Table A.5 in the Appendix).
22Deviations both above and below 5 are statistically signiﬁcant, although the marginal eﬀect on migration
is somewhat larger when the size of the group is below the optimal size.
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Table 4
Determinants of individual migration decisions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Is Punishingg,t -8.83
∗∗∗ -8.63∗∗∗ -8.89∗∗∗ -8.88∗∗∗ -22.20∗∗∗
(1.15) (1.09) (1.15) (1.15) (2.74)
Initial Groupi,t -23.20
∗∗∗ -23.15∗∗∗ -23.21∗∗∗ -21.94∗∗∗ -18.01∗∗∗
(1.93) (1.94) (1.93) (1.96) (1.61)
Contributioni,t - Group Contributiong[−i],t 3.18∗∗∗ 3.18∗∗∗ 3.15∗∗∗ 3.17∗∗∗ 1.86∗∗∗
(0.41) (0.42) (0.41) (0.40) (0.39)
abs(Group Sizeg,t - 5) 1.50
∗∗∗ 1.49∗∗∗ 1.51∗∗∗ 1.51∗∗∗ 1.04∗∗∗
(0.30) (0.28) (0.27) (0.29) (0.36)
Vote Diﬀerent from the Groupi,t−1 6.48∗∗∗
(1.94)
Vote Diﬀerent from the Groupi,t−1 under Rule-Set 1 4.50 4.31
(3.33) (3.32)
Vote Diﬀerent from the Groupi,t−1 under Rule-Set 2 7.83∗∗∗ 8.08∗∗∗
(2.47) (2.51)
Pre-Voting Periodt - Initial Groupi,t -0.79
(0.92)
Pre-Voting Periodt - Outside Initial Groupi,t 6.89
∗∗
(3.45)
Observations 7,250 7,250 7,250 7,250 7,250
Log likelihood -2,091.33 -2,082.14 -2,080.44 -2,078.04 -2,568.16
Notes. The table reports the change in the probability of moving (in percentage points) associated with a change in the covariates. Units of
observation are individuals-per-period. All the models include subject, period, group, and session random eﬀects. Standard errors are presented in
parentheses. Signiﬁcance levels: ∗∗∗ at 1%, ∗∗ at 5%, ∗ at 10%.
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Column (2) incorporates a dummy variable, Vote Diﬀerent from the Groupi,t−1, mea-
suring whether i's institutional choice in the most recent voting period diﬀered from the
decision of the majority of her group. We observe that the probability of migrating increases
when the group did not adopt subjects' preferred rule-set in the most recent voting round.
To determine whether this positive eﬀect is contingent on the institutional setting imple-
mented, column (3) adds an interaction between Vote Diﬀerent from the Groupi,t−1 and Is
Punishingg,t to the previous speciﬁcation. We can therefore compute the marginal eﬀects
of Vote Diﬀerent from the Groupi,t−1 under Rule-Set 1 (i.e., when Is Punishingg,t=0) and
Vote Diﬀerent from the Groupi,t−1 under Rule-Set 2 (when Is Punishingg,t=1). Although
the probability of moving is always higher on average for dissenters than for subjects who
agreed with the majority decision, only those who voted against sanctioning in groups that
adopted centralized punishment are signiﬁcantly more likely to migrate.
In column (4), we add an interaction between Pre-Voting Periodt  a dummy for periods
immediately before each voting round  and Initial Groupi,t, which allows us to assess whether
subjects in/out of their initial group are more or less likely to move right before groups choose
their institutions. Speciﬁcally, we calculate the marginal eﬀects of Pre-Voting Periodt when
subjects are currently located in their initial group (setting Initial Groupi,t=1 for all i) and
when subjects are located outside their initial group (i.e., when Initial Groupi,t=0 for all i). In
accordance with Hypothesis 2.5, we ﬁnd that subjects located outside their initial group are
more likely to move back right before a voting round  presumably to aﬀect the outcome of
the vote  than in other periods. By contrast, for individuals located in their initial group, no
signiﬁcant diﬀerences exist in the probability of moving in pre-voting vis-à-vis other periods.
Also, we ﬁnd no evidence of individuals being more likely to return to their original group
right after a voting round, once the institutional choice is known.23
For comparison, column (5) repeats the speciﬁcation in column (1) using data from NVM.
The marginal eﬀects of the covariates are qualitatively similar to those for VM, although the
23Additionally, we estimated models including the lagged dependent variable among the regressors, but
we ﬁnd no evidence of state dependence in migration decisions.
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impact of the sanctioning institution on the probability of moving is one and a half times
larger  in absolute value  when subjects are not allowed to vote on the rule-set.24
Voting. Lastly, we examine the determinants of subjects' voting decisions. Table 5 reports
marginal eﬀects computed from random eﬀects panel probit models ﬁtted to data from the
ﬁve voting rounds included in VM.25 The dependent variable, V otei,t, equals 1 (0) if i voted
for (against) the sanctioning institution in period t.
The explanatory variables in column (1) are essentially the same as those of previous
individual-level analyses, with Is Punishing now lagged one period to capture whether Rule-
Set 2 is in place in i's group before the current voting round. As stated in Remark 4, the
probability of voting in favor of the sanctioning institution is systematically higher for sub-
jects who remain in the group to which they were originally allocated. The average propensity
to support sanctions also rises for subjects located in groups that already implement sanc-
tions before t, and when the number of members in i's current group diﬀers from 5.26 These
last two eﬀects are, however, only marginally signiﬁcant.
Column (2) adds a linear time trend to the column (1) speciﬁcation and shows the prob-
ability of voting in favor of sanctions grows by 4.8 percentage points on average between
(consecutive) voting rounds, after controlling for other observed and unobserved factors.27
This ﬁnding reﬂects the patterns observed in the data and provides further support for Hy-
pothesis 2.2, with the proportion of subjects voting for sanctions going from 41% in the ﬁrst
voting period to 62% in the last round.
The steady increase in the probability of voting for institutions over the course of the
experiment is indicative of strong persistence in individual voting decisions. This result is
24Table A.6 in the Appendix replicates the analyses in Table 4 using Fernández-Val and Vella (2011)'s
two-step estimator to account for potential endogeneity of the explanatory variables and for dynamic feedback
from Migrationi,t to the predetermined regressors. Although the marginal eﬀect of abs(Group Sizeg,t - 5) is
never signiﬁcant, the estimates for the other covariates remain similar.
25Parameter estimates are reported in Table A.7 of the Appendix. For completeness, Table A.8 presents
estimates from bias-corrected ﬁxed-eﬀects panel probit models (Fernández-Val and Weidner, 2016).
26In particular, 1(Group Size>5)(Group Size-5) - but not of 1(Group Size<5)(5-Group Size) - has a
positive and signiﬁcant marginal eﬀect on Pr(V otei,t = 1).
27The signiﬁcant increase in Pr(V otei,t = 1) across periods is also observed using a quadratic time trend.
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Table 5
Determinants of individual voting decisions.
(1) (2) (3)
Is Punishingg,t−1 5.39∗ 4.77 -3.10
(3.09) (3.09) (3.61)
Initial Groupi,t 9.69
∗∗∗ 9.41∗∗∗ 7.61∗∗
(3.57) (3.55) (3.76)
Contributioni,t - Group Contributiong[−i],t -1.65 -1.64 -2.67
(1.41) (1.41) (1.64)
abs(Group Sizeg,t - 5) 1.52
∗ 1.48∗∗ 1.81∗∗
(0.79) (0.73) (0.91)
Time Trend 4.80∗∗∗ 3.14∗∗∗
(0.76) (1.19)
Votei,t−1 29.79∗∗∗
(5.39)
Observations 1,250 1,250 1,000
Log likelihood -612.38 -605.16 -457.79
Notes. The table reports the change in the probability of voting for sanctions (in percentage
points) associated with a change in the covariates. Units of observation are individuals-per-
voting period. All speciﬁcations include subject, period, group, and session random eﬀects;
columns (2)-(3) also include a linear time trend. Standard errors are presented in parentheses.
Signiﬁcance levels: ∗∗∗ at 1%, ∗∗ at 5%, ∗ at 10%.
conﬁrmed in Column (3), which adds the lagged dependent variable to the set of covariates.
The probability of voting for sanctions rises by almost 30% for a subject who already voted
in favor of Rule-Set 2 in the previous voting round. The marginal eﬀect of Is Punishingg,t−1
ceases to be signiﬁcant once we control for state dependence and for the growing propensity
to support sanctions over time.28
6 Conclusions
This paper analyzes the eﬀect of the endogenous choice of sanctioning institutions on
individuals' levels of cooperation and migration decisions. In our experiment, subjects are
28Table A.9 in the Appendix replicates the analyses in Table 5 accounting for covariate endogeneity through
a control-function approach for random eﬀects panel probit models (Giles and Murtazashvili, 2013). Unlike
Fernández-Val and Vella (2011)'s method, this approach does not rely on large-T asymptotics, and is thus
better suited for inference with only ﬁve voting periods. The estimates are in line with those in Table 5,
although the marginal eﬀect for Is Punishingg,t−1 remains positive and signiﬁcant in all speciﬁcations. We
also applied special regressor estimators (Dong and Lewbel, 2015) and obtained similar results.
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assigned to one of two groups and face a repeated social dilemma. Individuals can move
between groups and, in the main treatment, they vote at ﬁxed intervals on whether to
implement a formal (centralized) sanctioning institution in the group in which they are
located.
To study the eﬀect of location choices on both individuals and societies, we introduce
two features to our setting. First, subjects have group-speciﬁc preferences in that, all else
equal, they enjoy higher payoﬀs if located in the group to which they are initially assigned.
This feature accounts for the individual cost of migrating, which is generated by family and
social ties. Second, to capture the cost imposed on societies by sizable migration outﬂows,
we make the return from the public good (weakly) increasing in the group size. These two
features imply, all else equal, an eﬃcient partition of individuals across groups: at optimum,
each individual contributes to the public good in the group to which she is initially assigned.
We compare this treatment with one in which only one group is exogenously endowed with
sanctioning institutions. When subjects cannot vote over the sanctioning regime, because
sanctions positively aﬀect contributions to the public good, the group endowed with sanc-
tioning institutions (resp., the sanction-free group) tends to become overpopulated (resp., de-
populated). Even though sanctions ensure high overall contributions to the public good, this
migration ﬂow causes payoﬀ inequality both between groups and within the overpopulated
group. By contrast, when subjects can vote over the sanctioning regime, groups increasingly
implement sanctions over time, provide (more) eﬃcient levels of the public good, and coordi-
nate on the eﬃcient partition of individuals across groups. Subjects' eﬃcient location choices
signiﬁcantly increase overall payoﬀs and reduce payoﬀ inequality between and within groups.
At the individual level, subjects migrate less when voting over institutions is allowed; when
migrating, they tend to move back to their initial group in order to cast their ballot and
inﬂuence their initial group's institutional choice.
We conclude with two remarks. First, in our laboratory experiment, subjects manage
remarkably well to self-organize in diﬀerent dimensions. Even though complex individual
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decisions  such as where to locate  can only be imperfectly approximated in a laboratory
setting, this controlled environment allows us to take a close look at the composite relation-
ship between institutions, cooperation, and migration. This analysis, in turn, improves our
understanding of groups' ability to select eﬃcient outcomes. Second, our results seem to
suggest formal institutions are suﬃciently strong to stabilize migration patterns. In reality,
however, informal sanctioning institutions  and their interaction with formal ones  also
play a fundamental role in societies' ability to solve social dilemmas. Whether peer-to-peer
sanctioning institutions also adapt to and stabilize migration patterns to achieve eﬃcient
outcomes remains an open question, which we leave for future research.
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Appendix
A. Experimental Instructions
A.1. First Stage
You will be in a group of 5 people. You will receive 50 tokens (converted to cash at the end
of the experiment) and will choose to allocate some portion of these to your own individual
account and some portion to the group account. Your ﬁnal payoﬀs will be as follows:
50  (tokens you allocate to group account) + (1/5)× 2.250×
(sum of tokens allocated by all in group to group account)
At the end of the experiment tokens will be converted into GBP at the rate of 30 tokens
= 1 GBP.
A.2. Second Stage: Voting-Moving Treatment
There will be a total of 30 periods in the second activity. We will explain carefully what
you have to do in this second part.
Allocations: In each period, you will be in a group of some size (you could be also by
yourself). In each period, you will receive 50 tokens (converted to cash at the end of the
experiment) and will choose to allocate some portion of these to your own individual account
and some portion to the group account. Your ﬁnal payoﬀs will be as follows:
50  (tokens you allocate to group account) + (1/n)× Factor ×
(sum of tokens allocated by all in group to group account)
where n is the number of members of the group. The Factor that multiplies the sum of the
tokens is explained below.
41
Groups: In the ﬁrst period you will be assigned to a ﬁve people group (including yourself).
You can be assigned to either GROUP A or GROUP B. At the end of each period you will
have the chance of deciding whether you want to leave your group. We will explain in more
detail how you do this.
Group size and multiplying Factor: The total number of tokens that end up in the
group account is multiplied by a Factor. The table below shows the values of the Factor
depending on: (i) the group you are in and (ii) the group size.
Group Size (n)
Factor if in Factor if not in
the Initial Group the Initial Group
1 1.00 1.00
2 1.50 1.15
3 1.75 1.40
4 2.00 1.65
5 2.25 1.90
6 2.25 1.90
7 2.25 1.90
8 2.25 1.90
9 2.25 1.90
10 2.25 1.90
Each token allocated to the group account yields a return higher than one unit and all
members of the group share this return equally.
Note that the multiplying factor increases as the group size increases. The increment of
the factor with the group size will be capped at 5 members in the group. If the size of the
group goes above that, the factor will remain the same as if the size of the group was 5.
There will be two diﬀerent factors depending on whether you are in your initial group
or if you decided to switch groups. Given the size of the group, the factor will be always
larger if you are in your initial group than if you are in the other group. Thus, for the same
amount of tokens allocated to the group account, and for the same size of the group, tokens
allocated to the group account will generate more money if you are in your initial group.
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Each token allocated to one's private account pays one unit to that individual, indepen-
dently of the group size.
EXAMPLE: Consider the case in which one participant belongs to Group A and her initial
group was Group A. If in a ﬁve-person group the total number of tokens in the group
account is 100, that participant receives a payoﬀ of (100 × 2.250)/5=45 tokens from the
group account (plus the number of tokens allocated to her private account). By comparison,
suppose the participant is in Group B and her initial group was Group A. If in a ﬁve-
person group the total number of tokens in the group account is 100, then, that participant
receives a payoﬀ of (100 × 1.900)/5=38 tokens from the group account (plus the number of
tokens allocated to her private account).
Payment rules: there will be two diﬀerent Rule Sets, which aﬀect your earnings in
diﬀerent ways:
RULE SET 1 (no points reduction): In Rule Set 1, earnings are determined in exactly the
same way as explained in the Allocations section. So, payoﬀs will be computed as follows
50  (points you allocate to group account) + (1/n)× Factor ×
(sum of points allocated by all in group to group account)
RULE SET 2 (automatic points reduction): In Rule Set 2, each individual pays a ﬁxed fee
of 15 tokens in each period. The fee is deducted from your earnings at the end of the period.
In addition, each individual pays a ﬁne equal to 80 percent of the amount of tokens allocated
to the private account in that period. Payoﬀs in each period are calculated as follows:
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50  (points you allocate to group account) + (1/n)× Factor ×
(sum of points allocated by all in group to group account)  0.8
×(points you allocate to private account)  15
EXAMPLE: Consider the case in which one participant belongs to a group of 5 people and
RULE SET 2 (automatic points reduction) is in place. If the participant contributes 20
tokens to the group account and keeps 30 tokens for the private account, given RULE SET
2, that participant would have to pay a ﬁne of 0.8 × 30=24 tokens and then, she would keep
6 tokens out of 30.
Payment rules in ﬁrst 5 periods: If you were assigned to Group A, Rule Set 1 will
apply for the ﬁrst 5 periods. If you were assigned to group B, Rule set 2 will apply for the
ﬁrst 5 periods.
Group determination: At the end of each period, you will observe: (i) the average
contribution of your current group, (ii) the average contribution of the other group, (iii) the
rule set of your current group, and (iv) the rule set of the other group. Then, you will decide
whether you wish to leave the group and move to the other one.
Voting for rules: Initial rules for Groups A and B will apply only for the ﬁrst 5 periods.
Every ﬁve periods you will have the chance to vote on whether you want Rule Set 1 or Rule
Set 2 to be applied to the group you currently belong to. Note that when you vote, you will
vote to establish a rule in the group that you belong to in the voting period.
Payment: At the end of the experiment tokens will be converted into GBP at the rate of
30 tokens = 1GBP. You will be paid only for 3 randomly chosen periods.
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SUMMARY
1. There will be a total of 30 periods.
2. You will begin by being in a ﬁve-people group.
3. In each period, you will allocate 50 tokens between a private and a group account.
4. The returns from the group account depend on the size of the group and on whether
you are participating in your initial group or not.
5. You can decide at the end of the period whether you want to switch groups or not.
6. There are two payment rules. Every ﬁve period you will vote which of the two rules
you prefer.
7. You will be paid only for 3 rounds (randomly chosen).
A.3. Second Stage: No-Voting-Moving Treatment
There will be a total of 30 periods in the second activity. We will explain carefully what
you have to do in this second part.
Allocations: In each period, you will be in a group of some size (you could be also by
yourself). In each period, you will receive 50 tokens (converted to cash at the end of the
experiment) and will choose to allocate some portion of these to your own individual account
and some portion to the group account. Your ﬁnal payoﬀs will be as follows:
50  (tokens you allocate to group account) + (1/n)× Factor ×
(sum of tokens allocated by all in group to group account)
where n is the number of members of the group. The Factor that multiplies the sum of the
tokens is explained below.
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Groups: In the ﬁrst period you will be assigned to a ﬁve people group (including yourself).
You can be assigned to either GROUP A or GROUP B. At the end of each period you will
have the chance of deciding whether you want to leave your group. We will explain in more
detail how you do this.
Group size and multiplying Factor: The total number of tokens that end up in the
group account is multiplied by a Factor. The table below shows the values of the Factor
depending on: (i) the group you are in and (ii) the group size.
Group Size (n)
Factor if in Factor if not in
the Initial Group the Initial Group
1 1.00 1.00
2 1.50 1.15
3 1.75 1.40
4 2.00 1.65
5 2.25 1.90
6 2.25 1.90
7 2.25 1.90
8 2.25 1.90
9 2.25 1.90
10 2.25 1.90
Each token allocated to the group account yields a return higher than one unit and all
members of the group share this return equally.
Note that the multiplying factor increases as the group size increases. The increment of
the factor with the group size will be capped at 5 members in the group. If the size of the
group goes above that, the factor will remain the same as if the size of the group was 5.
There will be two diﬀerent factors depending on whether you are in your initial group
or if you decided to switch groups. Given the size of the group, the factor will be always
larger if you are in your initial group than if you are in the other group. Thus, for the same
amount of tokens allocated to the group account, and for the same size of the group, tokens
allocated to the group account will generate more money if you are in your initial group.
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Each token allocated to one's private account pays one unit to that individual, indepen-
dently of the group size.
EXAMPLE: Consider the case in which one participant belongs to Group A and
her initial group was Group A. If in a ﬁve-person group the total number of tokens in
the group account is 100, that participant receives a payoﬀ of (100 × 2.250)/5=45 tokens
from the group account (plus the number of tokens allocated to her private account). By
comparison, suppose the participant is in Group B and her initial group was Group A. If
in a ﬁve-person group the total number of tokens in the group account is 100, then, that
participant receives a payoﬀ of (100 × 1.900)/5=38 tokens from the group account (plus the
number of tokens allocated to her private account).
Payment rules: there will be two diﬀerent Rule Sets, which aﬀect your earnings in
diﬀerent ways:
RULE SET 1 (no points reduction): In Rule Set 1, earnings are determined in exactly the
same way as explained in the Allocations section. So, payoﬀs will be computed as follows
50  (points you allocate to group account) + (1/n)× Factor ×
(sum of points allocated by all in group to group account)
RULE SET 2 (automatic points reduction): In Rule Set 2, each individual pays a ﬁxed fee
of 15 tokens in each period. The fee is deducted from your earnings at the end of the period.
In addition, each individual pays a ﬁne equal to 80 percent of the amount of tokens allocated
to the private account in that period. Payoﬀs in each period are calculated as follows:
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50  (points you allocate to group account) + (1/n)× Factor ×
(sum of points allocated by all in group to group account)  0.8
×(points you allocate to private account)  15
EXAMPLE: Consider the case in which one participant belongs to a group of 5 people and
RULE SET 2 (automatic points reduction) is in place. If the participant contributes 20
tokens to the group account and keeps 30 tokens for the private account, given RULE SET
2, that participant would have to pay a ﬁne of 0.8 × 30=24 tokens and then, she would keep
6 tokens out of 30.
Payment rules: If you were assigned to Group A, Rule Set 1 will apply. If you were
assigned to group B, Rule set 2 will apply.
Group determination: At the end of each period, you will observe: (i) the average
contribution of your current group, (ii) the average contribution of the other group, (iii) the
rule set of your current group, and (iv) the rule set of the other group. Then, you will decide
whether you wish to leave the group and move to the other one.
Payment: At the end of the experiment tokens will be converted into GBP at the rate of
30 tokens = 1GBP. You will be paid only for 3 randomly chosen periods.
SUMMARY
1. There will be a total of 30 periods.
2. You will begin by being in a ﬁve-people group.
3. In each period, you will allocate 50 tokens between a private and a group account.
4. The returns from the group account depend on the size of the group and on whether
you are participating in your initial group or not.
48
5. You can decide at the end of the period whether you want to switch groups or not.
6. There are two payment rules.
7. You will be paid only for 3 rounds (randomly chosen).
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B. Additional Results
Table A.1
Parameter Estimates - Censored Regression Models for Contributions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Intercept 18.84∗∗∗ 18.93∗∗∗ 15.15∗∗∗ 18.94∗∗∗
(1.10) (1.13) (1.10) (1.82)
Is Punishingg,t 33.19
∗∗∗ 33.10∗∗∗ 31.13∗∗∗ 26.24∗∗∗
(0.77) (0.76) (0.74) (3.12)
Initial Groupi,t 4.14
∗∗∗ 4.25∗∗∗ 3.28∗∗∗ 1.23∗
(0.75) (0.78) (0.74) (0.74)
Group Contributiong[−i],t−1 0.30∗∗∗ 0.30∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ -0.03
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
abs(Group Sizeg,t - 5) -0.86
∗∗∗ -0.70∗∗∗ 0.95∗∗∗
(0.24) (0.22) (0.25)
1(Group Sizeg,t<5)(5 - Group Sizeg,t) -1.13
∗∗∗
(0.39)
1(Group Sizeg,t>5)(Group Sizeg,t - 5) -0.78
∗∗∗
(0.25)
Contributioni,t−1 0.35∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02)
Observations 7,250 7,250 7,250
Log likelihood -24,993.46 -24,987.21 -23,777.47 -24,246.43
Notes. The table reports raw parameter estimates for the static (columns 1-2) and dynamic (column 3-4) panel
data models used to compute the marginal eﬀects reported in Table 3. Columns (1)-(3) are ﬁtted to data from
the Voting-Moving treatment, whereas column (4) uses data from the No-Voting-Moving condition. All the spec-
iﬁcations include subject, period, group, and session random eﬀects. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Signiﬁcance levels: ∗∗∗ at 1%, ∗∗ at 5%, ∗ at 10%.
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Table A.2
Marginal Eﬀects of Covariates on Individual Contributions
Estimated from Fixed-Eﬀects Censored Regression Models
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Is Punishingg,t 14.77
∗∗∗ 14.74∗∗∗ 13.42∗∗∗ 14.23∗∗∗ 19.46∗∗∗ 19.29∗∗∗
(0.30) (0.30) (0.29) (0.33) (1.10) (1.09)
Initial Groupi,t 1.41
∗∗ 1.53∗∗ 1.24∗∗∗ 0.19 1.77∗∗ 2.13∗∗
(0.33) (0.35) (0.32) (0.33) (0.81) (0.82)
Group Contributiong[−i],t−1 0.13∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗ -0.02∗ 0.15∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
abs(Group Sizeg,t - 5) -0.46
∗∗∗ -0.42∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗∗ -0.42∗∗∗
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.14)
1(Group Sizeg,t<5)(5 - Group Sizeg,t) -0.58
∗∗∗ -1.07∗∗∗
(0.18) (0.34)
1(Group Sizeg,t>5)(Group Sizeg,t - 5) -0.44
∗∗ -0.31∗∗
(0.10) (0.15)
Contributioni,t−1 0.16∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01)
Observations 7,250 7,250 7,250 7,250 7,250 7,250
Notes. The table reports marginal eﬀects of the covariates on subjects' contributions, obtained from ﬁxed-eﬀects panel data censored
regression models. Columns (1)-(4) replicate the analyses in columns (1)-(4) of Table 3, using the split-panel jackknife estimation
approach proposed by Dhaene and Jochmans (2015) to correct for incidental parameter bias. For robustness, Columns (5) and (6)
also ﬁt the ﬁrst two static models using Honoré (1992)'s semiparametric estimator. Columns (1)-(3) and (5)-(6) are ﬁtted to data
from the Voting-Moving treatment, while column (4) uses data from the No-Voting-Moving condition. All speciﬁcations include
subject ﬁxed-eﬀects. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Signiﬁcance levels: ∗∗∗ at 1%, ∗∗ at 5%, ∗ at 10%.
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Table A.3
Determinants of Individual Contributions - Accounting for Covariate
Endogeneity Using Fernández-Val and Vella (2011)'s Two-Step Estimator
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Is Punishingg,t 12.91
∗∗∗ 12.89∗∗∗ 10.92∗∗∗ 14.43∗∗∗
(1.41) (1.67) (2.47) (0.57)
Initial Groupi,t 2.72
∗∗ 2.76∗∗ 2.33∗ 4.57∗∗∗
(1.25) (1.30) (1.35) (0.38)
Group Contributiong[−i],t−1 0.16∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ -0.01
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01)
abs(Group Sizeg,t - 5) -0.46 -0.48 0.31
∗∗∗
(0.39) (0.39) (0.12)
1(Group Sizeg,t<5)(5 - Group Sizeg,t) -0.45
(0.40)
1(Group Sizeg,t>5)(Group Sizeg,t - 5) -0.44
(0.46)
Contributioni,t−1 0.17∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.01)
Observations 7,250 7,250 7,250 7,250
Notes. The table replicates the analyses in Table 3, reporting marginal eﬀects of the covariates on subjects'
contributions estimated using Fernández-Val and Vella (2011)'s two-step (control function) approach for
non-linear panel data models. Columns (1)-(3) are ﬁtted to data from the Voting-Moving treatment, while
column (4) uses data from the No-Voting-Moving condition. These speciﬁcations treat Is Punishingg,t (in
the Voting-Moving treatment), Initial Groupi,t and the measures of deviations from the optimal group size
as endogenous, and allow for dynamic feedback from the dependent variable to the predictors. The control
variables are the (generalized) residuals from the reduced-form models for the endogenous variables, speciﬁed
as functions of pre-determined regressors - their own lagged values, the lagged average contribution of other
members of i's group, the lagged values of Rh (n), indicators capturing whether subjects' decision in the most
recent voting round coincided with their/the other group's institutional choice (in columns 1-3), dummies
for periods right before and after a voting round (in columns 1-3), and the lag of Is Punishingg,t (in column
4) - along with subject ﬁxed eﬀects. All speciﬁcations in the table include subject ﬁxed-eﬀects; although
time dummies (or time trends) are not covered by Fernández-Val and Vella (2011)' regularity conditions,
adding them does not alter the results. Standard errors are reported in parentheses; we combined split-
panel jackknife estimation and (panel) bootstrapping to correct for incidental parameter bias and adjust for
generated regressors (Dhaene and Jochmans, 2015). Signiﬁcance levels: ∗∗∗ at 1%, ∗∗ at 5%, ∗ at 10%. The
ﬁrst-step (reduced-form) estimates are available from the authors upon request.
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Table A.4
Parameter Estimates - Probit Panel Models for Migration
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Intercept -0.91∗∗∗ -0.95∗∗∗ -0.99∗∗∗ -1.02∗∗∗ -0.25
(0.18) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19)
Is Punishingg,t -0.56
∗∗∗ -0.55∗∗∗ -0.58∗∗∗ -0.58∗∗∗ -1.00∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.11)
Initial Groupi,t -1.10
∗∗∗ -1.11∗∗∗ -1.10∗∗∗ -1.06∗∗∗ -0.82∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05)
Contributioni,t - Group Contributiong[−i],t 0.21∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
abs(Group Sizeg,t - 5) 0.12
∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Vote Diﬀerent from the Groupi,t−1 0.37∗∗∗ 0.20 0.20
(0.10) (0.14) (0.14)
Vote Diﬀerent from the Groupi,t−1 × Is Punishingg,t 0.32 0.33∗
(0.19) (0.19)
Pre-Voting Periodt 0.22
∗∗
(0.11)
Pre-Voting Periodt × Initial Groupi,t -0.29∗∗
(0.14)
Observations 7,250 7,250 7,250 7,250 7,250
Log likelihood -2,091.33 -2,082.14 -2,080.44 -2,078.04 -2,568.16
Notes. The table reports raw parameter estimates for the panel probit models used to compute the marginal eﬀects reported in Table 4.
Columns (1)-(4) are ﬁtted to data from the Voting-Moving treatment, while column (5) uses data from the No-Voting-Moving condition. All
the models include subject, period, group, and session random eﬀects. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Signiﬁcance levels: ∗∗∗ at
1%, ∗∗ at 5%, ∗ at 10%.
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Table A.5
Parameter Estimates - Fixed-Eﬀects Probit Panel Models for Migration
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Is Punishingg,t -0.65
∗∗∗ -0.65∗∗∗ -0.67∗∗∗ -0.64∗∗∗ -0.85∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Initial Groupi,t -0.93
∗∗∗ -0.93∗∗∗ -0.93∗∗∗ -0.89∗∗∗ -0.68∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05)
Contributioni,t - Group Contributiong[−i],t 0.20∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
abs(Group Sizeg,t - 5) 0.11
∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Vote Diﬀerent from the Groupi,t−1 0.37∗∗∗ 0.18 0.17
(0.12) (0.16) (0.14)
Vote Diﬀerent from the Groupi,t−1 × Is Punishingg,t 0.37∗ 0.34∗
(0.20) (0.20)
Pre-Voting Periodt 0.20
∗
(0.11)
Pre-Voting Periodt × Initial Groupi,t -0.28∗∗
(0.14)
Observations 5,336 5,336 5,336 5,336 5,626
Log likelihood -1,850.55 -1,845.60 -1,843.61 -1,856.93 -2,307.12
Notes. The table reports parameter estimates from bias-corrected ﬁxed-eﬀects panel probit models for migration using Fernández-Val and
Weidner (2016)'s method. The bias correction is obtained from jackknife estimates; using an analytical correction yields virtually identical
results. Columns (1)-(4) are ﬁtted to data from the Voting-Moving treatment, while column (5) uses data from the No-Voting-Moving condition.
Diﬀerence in number of observations vis-à-vis Tables 4 and A.4 are due to the fact that Fernández-Val and Weidner (2016)'s method drops
subjects for whom the dependent variable does not change over time. All the models include subject ﬁxed-eﬀects. Columns (1)-(3) and (5) also
include period ﬁxed-eﬀects, which must be dropped in column (4) in order to recover the coeﬃcient for Pre-Voting Periodt. Standard errors are
reported in parentheses. Signiﬁcance levels: ∗∗∗ at 1%, ∗∗ at 5%, ∗ at 10%.
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Table A.6
Determinants of Individual Migration Decisions - Accounting for Covariate Endogeneity
using Fernández-Val and Vella (2011)'s Two-Step Estimator
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Is Punishingg,t -10.07
∗∗∗ -10.02∗∗∗ -9.94∗∗∗ -9.86∗∗∗ -17.37∗∗∗
(2.50) (2.52) (2.51) (2.51) (2.00)
Initial Groupi,t -13.72
∗∗∗ -13.74∗∗∗ -13.68∗∗∗ -12.48∗∗∗ -8.67∗
(3.84) (3.83) (3.84) (3.83) (4.73)
Contributioni,t - Group Contributiong[−i],t 3.04∗∗∗ 3.04∗∗∗ 3.03∗∗∗ 2.99∗∗∗ 1.77∗∗∗
(0.61) (0.60) (0.60) (0.61) (0.63)
abs(Group Sizeg,t - 5) 1.40 1.45 1.45 1.47 -0.84
(0.92) (0.92) (0.92) (0.95) (2.19)
Vote Diﬀerent from the Groupi,t−1 6.63∗∗
(2.60)
Vote Diﬀerent from the Groupi,t−1 under Rule-Set 1 4.70 4.52
(4.19) (4.18)
Voted Against the Groupi,t−1 under Rule-Set 2 7.85∗∗ 8.06∗∗
(3.41) (3.42)
Pre-Voting Periodt - Initial Groupi,t -1.30
(1.63)
Pre-Voting Periodt - Outside Initial Groupi,t 5.83
∗∗
(2.68)
Observations 7,250 7,250 7,250 7,250 7,250
Notes. The table replicates the analyses in Table 4, reporting marginal eﬀects of the covariates on the probability of moving (in percentage
points), using Fernández-Val and Vella (2011)'s two-step (control function) approach for non-linear panel data models. Columns (1)-(4) are
ﬁtted to data from the Voting-Moving treatment, while column (5) uses data from the No-Voting-Moving condition. These speciﬁcations treat Is
Punishingg,t (in the Voting-Moving treatment), Initial Groupi,t and abs(Group Sizeg,t - 5) as endogenous, and allow for dynamic feedback from
the dependent variable to the predictors. The control variables are the (generalized) residuals from the reduced-form models for the endogenous
variables, speciﬁed as functions of pre-determined regressors - their own lagged values, the lagged average contribution of other members of i's
group, the lagged values of Rh (n), indicators capturing whether subjects' decision in the most recent voting round coincided with their/the
other group's institutional choice (in columns 1-4), dummies for periods right before and after a voting round (in columns 1-4), and the lag
of Is Punishingg,t (in column 5) - along with subject ﬁxed-eﬀects. All speciﬁcations in the table include subject ﬁxed-eﬀects; although time
dummies (or time trends) are not covered by Fernández-Val and Vella (2011)' regularity conditions, adding them does not alter the results.
Standard errors are reported in parentheses; we combined split-panel jackknife estimation and (panel) bootstrapping to correct for incidental
parameter bias and adjust for generated regressors (Dhaene and Jochmans, 2015). Signiﬁcance levels: ∗∗∗ at 1%, ∗∗ at 5%, ∗ at 10%. The
ﬁrst-step (reduced-form) estimates are available from the authors upon request.
55
Table A.7
Parameter Estimates - Probit Panel Models for Voting
(1) (2) (3)
Intercept -2.11∗∗∗ -2.83∗∗∗ -2.05∗∗∗
(0.40) (0.40) (0.35)
Is Punishingg,t−1 0.24∗ 0.21 -0.15
(0.13) (0.13) (0.16)
Initial Groupi,t 0.43
∗∗∗ 0.42∗∗∗ 0.31∗∗
(0.16) (0.16) (0.15)
Contributioni,t - Group Contributiong[−i],t -0.08 -0.08 -0.11∗
(0.06) (0.06) (0.07)
abs(Group Sizeg,t - 5) 0.10
∗∗ 0.09∗ 0.11∗
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Time Trend 0.04∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01)
Votei,t−1 1.01∗∗∗
(0.15)
Observations 1,250 1,250 1,250
Log likelihood -612.38 -605.16 -457.79
Notes. The table reports raw parameter estimates for the static (columns 1-2) and dynamic
(column 3) panel probit models used to compute the marginal eﬀects reported in Table 5.
All speciﬁcations include subject, period, group, and session random eﬀects; columns (2)-(3)
also include a linear time trend. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Signiﬁcance
levels: ∗∗∗ at 1%, ∗∗ at 5%, ∗ at 10%.
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Table A.8
Parameter Estimates
Fixed-Eﬀects Probit Panel Models for Voting
(1) (2) (3)
Is Punishingg,t−1 0.47∗∗∗ 0.44∗∗∗ -0.07
(0.14) (0.14) (0.20)
Initial Groupi,t 0.41
∗∗ 0.38∗∗ 0.79∗∗∗
(0.18) (0.18) (0.22)
Contributioni,t - Group Contributiong[−i],t -0.05 -0.05 0.07
(0.07) (0.07) (0.09)
abs(Group Sizeg,t - 5) 0.00 -0.01 0.20
∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.06) (0.07)
Time Trend 0.03∗∗∗ -0.01
(0.01) (0.01)
Votei,t−1 12.32∗∗∗
(0.18)
Observations 665 665 420
Log likelihood -349.14 -349.97 -230.42
Notes. The table reports parameter estimates from bias-corrected ﬁxed-eﬀects panel probit
models for Votei,t using Fernández-Val and Weidner (2016)'s method. The bias correction
is obtained from jackknife estimates; using an analytical correction yields virtually identical
results. Note that Fernández-Val and Weidner (2016)'s method relies on large-T (and large-
N) asymptotics, and thus is not particularly well suited for the analysis of data from only ﬁve
voting periods. Diﬀerences in the number of observations vis-á-vis Tables 5 and A.7 are due
to the fact that Fernández-Val and Weidner (2016)'s method drops subjects for whom the
dependent variable does not change over time. All the models include subject ﬁxed-eﬀects.
Column (1) also includes period ﬁxed-eﬀects, which must be dropped in columns (2) and (3)
due to the addition of a Time Trend to the model speciﬁcation. Standard errors are reported
in parentheses. Signiﬁcance levels: ∗∗∗ at 1%, ∗∗ at 5%, ∗ at 10%.
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Table A.9
Determinants of Individual Voting Decisions
Accounting for Covariate Endogeneity Using
Giles and Murtazashvili (2013)'s Control Function Approach
(1) (2) (3)
Is Punishingg,t−1 13.94∗∗∗ 12.81∗∗∗ 15.49∗∗∗
(4.00) (3.90) (5.09)
Initial Groupi,t 11.00
∗∗∗ 10.46∗∗∗ 8.86∗
(3.60) (3.44) (4.88)
Contributioni,t - Group Contributiong[−i],t 0.58 0.55 0.27
(1.65) (1.62) (1.91)
abs(Group Sizeg,t - 5) 3.10
∗∗∗ 2.99∗∗∗ 3.10∗∗∗
(0.91) (0.87) (0.92)
Time Trend 4.64∗∗∗ 1.19
(0.73) (0.96)
Votei,t−1 43.60∗∗∗
(4.60)
Observations 1,250 1,250 1,000
Notes. The table replicates the analyses in Table 5, reporting marginal eﬀects of the covariates
on the probability of voting for institutions (in percentage points), using a control function
approach for random eﬀects panel probit models (Giles and Murtazashvili, 2013). Hausman
tests justify the need to control for the endogeneity of Initial Groupi,t and abs(Group Sizeg,t -
5) (p-values<0.01 across all speciﬁcations). We used as instruments the fourth and ﬁfth lags of
the average contributions of other members of i's group (Smith, 2013), an indicator for subjects
who moved in the period before each voting round, and dummies for subjects who contributed
more than 35 tokens in the ﬁrst stage of the experiment - as a proxy for their behavioral type
(Gürerk, Irlenbusch and Rockenbach, 2006). Diagnostic tests indicate that the instruments are
valid and not weak (the ﬁrst-stage F-statistics are always higher than 10) (Stock and Yogo, 2005;
Wooldridge, 2010). As required by Giles and Murtazashvili (2013)'s method, we ﬁtted linear
ﬁrst-stage regressions for Initial Groupi,t, which work well in practice for dealing with binary
endogenous covariates (Angrist, 2001). As an alternative, we used the generalized residuals of
probit models as control variables (Fernández-Val and Vella, 2011) and applied special regressor
estimators (Dong and Lewbel, 2015), which are better suited for dealing with non-continuously
distributed endogenous variables; the results are qualitatively similar. Bootstrapped standard
errors adjusting for the ﬁrst-stage estimation (Giles and Murtazashvili, 2013) are reported in
parentheses. Signiﬁcance levels: ∗∗∗ at 1%, ∗∗ at 5%, ∗ at 10%. The ﬁrst-stage estimates are
available from the authors upon request.
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